Was it Thomism all along?

There exists a tension within the soul of Irish republicanism that has been ignored for far too long. It is the tension between Gaelic particularism and republican universalism. In his graveside oration on the death of O'Donovan Rossa, Patrick Pearse endorsed the vision attributed to the deceased of an Ireland "not free merely, but Gaelic as well; not Gaelic merely, but free as well". Republicans can legitimately strive for an 'Irish Ireland' and still be republican; the question here how such an aim is rationalised in theory. The problem is that Gaelicism is clearly a particular conception of the good. Yet republicanism proper is supposed to be neutral as to particular ideas of the good, promoting only the good of civic virtue and vigilance. Some will point out that a republic is also concerned with promoting justice, liberty and equality, but these are principles of right, not good. 

Pearse didn't create this tension of course. Two of the four figures he references in Ghosts, Tone and Davis, demonstrate it. Tone is part of a wider Enlightenment rationalist tradition and that is reflected in how he speaks about liberty and freedom. Spiritually, his thinking was understandably close to that of the French Revolution. Davis, writing half a century later, is part of a different zeitgeist - a romantic nationalism that is rooted in the German thinking of the 19th century (note). For Tone the nation is something created to achieve an end, freedom from tyranny. We cast off whatever prior labels we have and band together under the common name of 'Irishman' in order to sever the English connection. To become free, we leave our various notions of the good - catholic, protestant, dissenter - at the door. Davis saw the nation quite differently, something explicitly ancient and spiritual. The unified nation exists prior to politics or the state. He wants us to be free but more importantly he wants us to be us.

As Pearse wrote in Ghosts:

"Davis was the first of modern Irishmen to make explicit the truth that a nationality is a spirituality. Tone had postulated the great primal truth that Ireland must be free. Davis, accepting that and developing it; stated the truth in its spiritual aspect, that Ireland must be herself; not merely a free self-governing state, but authentically the Irish nation, bearing all the majestic marks of her nationhood."

Tone and Davis were both protestant. The cleavage between catholic and protestant within Irish separatism is sometimes remarked upon but here we have a very significant difference between two protestant separatists; a view of the nation as subsequent to the state/political versus a view of the nation as prior to it.

Both views are in conflict and neither view on its own is satisfactory for the 'Irish Irelander'. Under Tone's view, we have freedom but without a detailed conception of the good, such as the desire to restore Gaelic society. Indeed, Tone had little interest in Irish culture (see Bartlett, p39). There's nothing inconsistent about this; it is not at all clear how one derives the promotion of Gaelic culture or any particular culture from discussions about the right. Today, we hear Provisional Sinn Féin press for Irish language rights in the six counties. Of course, in trying to reconcile the need to appear cosmopolitan with the instinct to conserve our native culture, they must push the lingo of rights to its extreme. It's all rather disingenuous. A right will certainly give anyone who wants to speak the Irish language assistance, but it won't encourage anyone to learn it in the first place which is surely the point.

With Davis, meanwhile, you have a different problem; the potential for the good to run amok and encroach upon freedom. To take the Irish language example again, Davis was cited by Pearse as a major inspiration for the later Gaelic revival. Without wanting to put words in Davis' mouth, a logical extension of his view (as presented by Pearse) is probably the 20th century policy of compulsory Irish in schools. If the goal is to be authentically ourselves, such a policy is surely warranted. Compulsory Irish can be said to restrict individual freedom. In practice, nationalists/republicans would not have a problem with this policy, reasonably asserting that there is no such thing as perfect freedom and that sometimes rights will be infringed in the name of the good. The problem is that this kind of argument feels arbitrary and sounds like special pleading. It can also rebound on the person making it when the view of the 'good' changes. What is the recourse if he has already conceded that the good can trump rights? It becomes a battle over the meaning of authenticity, but this is a highly judgmental and subjective test. Another problem with simply asserting the good is that a point comes where coercion becomes self-defeating; we get the Murder Machine as anticipated by Pearse himself.

Thomism

A solution to the above is found by going back to the idea of the Natural Law. According to St Thomas Aquinas, there are four categories of law; Eternal, Divine, Natural and Human. The highest category is the Eternal Law which governs everything according to God's perfect plan. It is largely inaccessible to humans. Natural Law is that part of the eternal law that is accessible to humans via the unique faculty of reason. Divine Law is that part of the Eternal Law as revealed through scripture and sacred tradition and is the proper domain of the Church. Finally, Human Law is positive secular law and is the proper domain of the state. The Natural Law is real in that it exists independently of us and it is objective in that its provisions can be known through reason.

An appeal to the Natural Law is therefore an appeal to the right. It differs from Enlightenment appeals to the right in two respects. The first is its realism; its obligations pre-exist us due to the fact that it is derived from nature which is created by God (an important point here is that natural law is different from the physical laws of nature). Enlightenment thinkers can assert the objectivity of moral law, but without the divine element, cannot assert its reality beyond the world of empirical observation. Immanuel Kant, the finest of these thinkers, could at best postulate an objective moral law. He could not say it existed as a fact. The second is its account of the good. The Natural Law as described by Aquinas provides a singular and objective account of the good. Simply put, it tells us that everything in creation is endowed with an inclination towards the good (and therefore God); goodness for a thing is its actualisation and perfection in accordance with its inherent purpose. This is called teleology. Enlightenment thinkers tended to reject the idea of intrinsic purpose and therefore inherent good; this means that good becomes subjective and inferior to the right. Romanticists inverted this reasoning, accepting the subjectivity of the good but prioritising it over the right, leading to relativism.

The Good

What then does the Natural Law tell us about the good that the romanticists and Enlightenment rationalists cannot? As stated, the Natural Law derives an ought from an is because it sees everything as having inherent God-given purpose and sees the good as the fulfilment of that purpose. Another important point should be noted here. Aquinas was an Aristotelian; for him perfection was not attained by moving beyond the immediate world to some higher realm of pure forms. Qua Aristotle, universals and particulars are not radically separate notions. In fact, reality for humans is a composite of both. No universal exists that is not instantiated in a particular. For example, humans are essentially social and political beings. They cannot simply be abstracted from their environment, society and culture. If the goal is to cultivate human flourishing, this is achieved in the contexts that humans are situated. My personhood is not fully realised by my turning away from my national heritage but through the embracement of it. Similarly, it is not realised by turning away from my family or community, but through those things. There can of course be individual flourishing beyond that, but it does not come at the cost of those things. 

Returning to the example of compulsory Irish then, where does this new reasoning leave us? What we have said about the Natural Law and the good have two implications for the debate. Firstly, as a matter of right, there is a direct case to be made for the policy but it is insufficient. We could say that the forced unlearning of the Irish language, as would be the case with any language of the world, is manifestly wrong and so equivalent measures to restore the language are right insofar as they are proportionate and necessary. However, this must be balanced against the rights of the individual and this once again is where the language of justice alone starts to break down. Why should someone today be responsible for a wrong committed by someone else in the past? Two wrongs don't make a right etc. The language of right alone leaves us in a stalemate and competing claims can only be settled by a reference to some good.

This is where the second appeal to the good as deduced from the Natural Law is decisive. From the principle of cultivating perfection in combination with the Aristotelian view of the individual as a social and political animal rooted in his time and place, we can deduce that the Gaelic restoration for the Irish nation constitutes an objective good for both the nation and individuals as its members. The intrinsic purpose of the Irish nation, and its members (among other things), is to be Gaelic. As this purpose is derived from the right, it is pursued always with principles of justice and fairness in mind.

The connection between a person and his country's traditions is a special one. In his The Framework of a Christian State, Fr Edward Cahill reflected on the teachings of Pope Leo XIII, who believed that the natural law enjoined us to 'love devotedly and to the defend the country in which we had birth and in which we were brought up.' His holiness also wrote that 'we are bound then to love dearly our country, whence we have received the means of enjoyment which this mortal life affords.' (p590) Taking this, Cahill writes that the Christian in being patriotic is merely doing his duty after his religious obligations, provided he does so in accordance with the principles of justice and charity. For Cahill, the special duties of patriotism involved defending the freedom and integrity of the nation but also its traditions and culture.

Note: Coakley traces the nationalism of Davis to the thinking of German philosopher Herder, though notes that Davis in contrast to Herder based his idea of common feeling of devotion, pride in the past and will to serve rather than language. (p125).